Skip to content

BTM vs launchd Overrides: Two Kinds of Disabled

How the BTM disposition differs from launchd's disabled.plist overrides on macOS, what each records, and how to read the combinations in an investigation.

Published on 7 min read
On this page

TL;DR. macOS keeps two separate records of whether a background job may run. Background Task Management keeps a disposition per item, with enabled and allowed bits, behind the Login Items pane. launchd keeps its own override database, /private/var/db/com.apple.xpc.launchd/disabled.plist and disabled.<uid>.plist, written by launchctl disable and launchctl enable and keyed by label. They answer different questions, are set by different actions, and can disagree. Read both: a job enabled in BTM but disabled in launchd, or an override for a security tool's label, tells you something neither file shows alone.

launchd's overrides

The launchctl man page describes the subcommands: enable and disable change whether a service may be loaded in a domain; once disabled, a service cannot be loaded in that domain until it is enabled again, and the state persists across boots. It applies to the system domain and to user and user-login domains. launchctl print-disabled <domain> prints the list.

The launchd.plist man page adds the other half. A plist can carry a Disabled key, but that key "may be overridden" through launchctl enable. Earlier systems wrote the change into the plist itself; now, the page says, "this state is kept externally". The external state is the override database:

FileDomain
/private/var/db/com.apple.xpc.launchd/disabled.plistsystem
/private/var/db/com.apple.xpc.launchd/disabled.<uid>.plistthe user with that UID

Each file maps a label to true (disabled) or false (enabled). They are readable without root, and the folder can also hold loginitems.<uid>.plist files from the older Service Management login item call. Releases before 10.10 are reported to have used /private/var/db/launchd.db/com.apple.launchd/overrides.plist.

launchctl print-disabled system
launchctl print-disabled gui/501
plutil -p /private/var/db/com.apple.xpc.launchd/disabled.501.plist

Overrides are not only written by people at a shell. macOS keeps entries for its own services too; Remote Login, for example, is commonly seen as com.openssh.sshd in disabled.plist when it is off.

BTM's disposition

The BTM store records, per item, four bits: enabled, allowed, hidden and notified. Every item has a switch in Login Items, and an MDM payload can approve items. Apple does not document which bit each action changes, or how BTM's state reaches launchd. The details of the bits are in reading sfltool dumpbtm output.

Side by side

BTM dispositionlaunchd override
WhereBackgroundItems-v<N>.btmdisabled.plist, disabled.<uid>.plist
Keyed byBTM record (identifier, URL)launchd label
Set byLogin Items in System Settings, MDM approval, BTM itselflaunchctl enable and disable, some system settings
ScopeThe user section the record is inOne domain: system, or one user
CoversLogin items, agents, daemons, app helpers BTM has seenAny launchd label, including Apple's own services
Needsroot and Full Disk Access to readReadable by any user
TimeNone documented per itemThe file's modification time, for the whole file
After the plist is deletedThe record may remainThe entry may remain

Two of these rows matter in practice. Keys: BTM points at a plist by URL, launchd uses the label inside it, and the two can differ from the file name. In the FIN-MBP-03 sample, /Library/LaunchAgents/com.google.keystone.agent.plist has the label com.google.keystone.user.agent. Join through the plist, never by file name. Scope: an agent in /Library/LaunchAgents loads in every user's domain, so an override in one user's file switches it off for that user only.

Reading the combinations

BTMOverrideWhat it usually means
EnabledNoneNormal: the job loads when its conditions are met
DisabledtrueSwitched off, and launchd agrees
DisabledNoneSwitched off in BTM only. Test on the same release before claiming launchd ignores it
EnabledtrueDisabled with launchctl outside Login Items, or a label mismatch. Find out who ran it
No recordtrueLeftover from removed software, or a service someone wanted silenced
Anyfalse for a plist with Disabled = trueExplicitly enabled despite the plist

Two rows deserve emphasis.

An override for a security tool. launchctl disable keeps a service from loading across reboots. An intruder with root can use it against an endpoint agent, and the BTM record of that agent can still read enabled and allowed. Check the system and per-user override files for every security and management label on the Mac.

An override with no record and no plist. Removed software can leave overrides behind, so this alone means little. It becomes interesting when the label matches something else in the case, or when the override file changed at a time that matters.

The FIN-MBP-03 sample

ItemBTMOverride
com.openssh.sshd, com.apple.ftpd, com.apple.screensharingNot in the storetrue in disabled.plist, since setup on 2026-02-10
us.zoom.updater (ZoomUpdater)0xa: allowed, notified, disabledtrue in disabled.501.plist, file modified 2026-03-04 08:05:51 UTC
com.example.updater0xb: enabled, allowed, notifiedNone

The first row is macOS's own state: services that are off by default. The second is dana.whitlock switching off the Zoom updater in March; both records agree. The third is the planted agent: enabled in BTM, nothing in launchd's way, and loaded with launchctl bootstrap in gui/501 on 2026-09-14. Nothing in either file stopped it, and nothing would have.

The override file's modification time is the only time either source gives, and it covers the whole file: the latest change to any label in it, not to the one you care about.

A workflow

  1. Run sfltool dumpbtm, or load the store on BTM Parser. For each item of interest, note the URL and disposition.
  2. Read the plist at that URL and note its Label and any Disabled key.
  3. Look the label up in disabled.plist and in the disabled.<uid>.plist of the user whose section the record is in.
  4. Then go the other way: list every label in the override files and look for its plist and BTM record. Pay attention to security and management labels.
  5. Take times from the unified log (launchctl commands run through sudo are logged with their arguments) and file times, not from either store.

BTM Parser joins each record to its launch plist when you load the LaunchAgents and LaunchDaemons folders with the store, which gives you the label for step 3. BTM Parser does not read the override files: compare them by hand (launchctl print-disabled, or the plists themselves). The collection commands that take the override folder are in collecting the BTM store.

FAQ

Where are launchd overrides stored on modern macOS?

In /private/var/db/com.apple.xpc.launchd/: disabled.plist for the system domain and disabled.<uid>.plist for each user. Each maps a launchd label to true (disabled) or false (enabled). launchctl print-disabled shows the same list for a domain.

Does switching an item off in Login Items write a launchd override?

Apple does not document how the Login Items switch relates to launchd's override database. Test it on a lab Mac of the same release: compare launchctl print-disabled and sfltool dumpbtm before and after.

Which one wins, the Disabled key in the plist or the override?

The override. The launchd.plist man page says the Disabled key may be overridden with launchctl enable, and that this state is now kept outside the plist.

Is an override for a security product's label suspicious?

Yes, if nobody can explain it. Disabling a service with launchctl disable keeps it from loading across reboots. An override for an EDR or management agent's label is worth reporting even when the BTM record still says enabled.

Frequently asked questions

Where are launchd overrides stored on modern macOS?

In /private/var/db/com.apple.xpc.launchd/: disabled.plist for the system domain and disabled.<uid>.plist for each user. Each maps a launchd label to true (disabled) or false (enabled). launchctl print-disabled shows the same list for a domain.

Does switching an item off in Login Items write a launchd override?

Apple does not document how the Login Items switch relates to launchd's override database. Test it on a lab Mac of the same release: compare launchctl print-disabled and sfltool dumpbtm before and after.

Which one wins, the Disabled key in the plist or the override?

The override. The launchd.plist man page says the Disabled key may be overridden with launchctl enable, and that this state is now kept outside the plist.

Is an override for a security product's label suspicious?

Yes, if nobody can explain it. Disabling a service with launchctl disable keeps it from loading across reboots. An override for an EDR or management agent's label is worth reporting even when the BTM record still says enabled.